Selected Systems Engineering Process Deficiencies & Their Consequences
- Paper number
IAC-06-D1.5.02
- Author
Dr. Lawrence Dale Thomas, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), United States
- Year
2006
- Abstract
The systems engineering process is well established and well understood. While this statement could be argued in the light of the many systems engineering guidelines and that have been developed, comparative review of these respective descriptions reveal that they differ primarily in the number of discrete steps or other nuances, and are at their core essentially common. Likewise, the systems engineering textbooks differ primarily in the context for application of systems engineering or in the utilization of evolved tools and techniques, not in the basic method. Thus, failures in systems engineering cannot credibly be attributed to implementation of the wrong systems engineering process among alternatives. However, numerous systems failures can be attributed to deficient implementation of the systems engineering process. What may clearly be perceived as a system engineering deficiency in retrospect can appear to be a well considered system engineering efficiency in real time – an efficiency taken to reduce cost or meet a schedule, or more often both. Typically these efficiencies are grounded on apparently solid rationale, such as reuse of heritage hardware or software. Over time, unintended consequences of a systems engineering process deficiency may begin to be realized, and unfortunately often the consequence is system failure. This paper describes several actual cases of system failures that resulted from deficiencies in their systems engineering process implementation, including the Arianne 5 and the Hubble Space Telescope.
- Abstract document
- Manuscript document
IAC-06-D1.5.02.pdf (🔒 authorized access only).
To get the manuscript, please contact IAF Secretariat.