A Security Analysis of Space-based Weapons and Credible Alternatives

Paper number

IAC-06-E3.P.3.02

Author

Dr. William Marshall, Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, United States

Year

2006

Abstract

Some states are becoming critically dependent on satellites and yet satellites have some inherent vulnerabilities to attack – this is a genuine security problem. Some in the US have proposed solving this by using space-based weapons. Moreover there are some development programmes in the US for some of these concepts with the first set to be deployed within a 5-year timescale. 

This paper goes through a first order analysis of the net security impact of the 4 different space-based weapons systems that have been seriously proposed. This is based upon a clear set of criteria laid out. It shows that each weapon is likely to have a net negative impact upon the national security of the US or any other state choosing to develop and deploy them.  This is largely due to the fundamental technological asymmetry of space which means that relative to the task of making an effective space-based weapon, its counter measure is trifling. With its positive security effects easily negated, its negative security effects, mainly associated with driving increased capability of other states to have ground based anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, dominate: by accelerating other states plans to deploy these, space-based weapons could in fact jeopardise all other space assets, a dynamic in which the US has the most to loose. It is concluded that proponents of space-based weapons systems should shoulder the burden of showing analytically how they enhance US security before any further development funds are provided.

As an alternative, an overall concept is discussed of how to overcome satellite vulnerabilities. The prescription centers on a new satellite architecture – the ‘Multi-tiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture’ (MMCA) – which reduces risks to space assets by increasing system redundancy, modularity and dispersion through the use of microsatellite constellations in several orbital tiers. An example constellation design is given for each of the 5 major contemporary military space uses. In addition to the proposed architecture there are 3 complimentary elements that enable security of space assets: (1) better protection systems on individual satellites and space systems, including back up ground stations; (2) responsive space access, a system of terrestrial alternatives to space systems and the ability to negate an adversaries anti-satellite systems; and (3) treaties and verification means thereof, and better space surveillance. The resulting system is compared to the existing architecture of the US and has substantially reduced vulnerability to attack, having no single point failures to existing recognized threats.

Abstract document

IAC-06-E3.P.3.02.pdf

Manuscript document

IAC-06-E3.P.3.02.pdf (🔒 authorized access only).

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