GNSS Jamming and Spoofing under National and International Law
- Paper number
IAC-20,E7,4,11,x56441
- Author
Dr. Ingo Baumann, Germany, BHO Legal
- Coauthor
Mr. Erik Pellander, Germany, BHO Legal
- Year
2020
- Abstract
Jamming and spoofing can pose significant threats to space assets. Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are specifically vulnerable in this respect, considering the very low power of their signals and services. Due to their importance for military operations, for critical national infrastructure and key economic sectors, GNSS constitute primary targets in future warfare. Several incidents of GNSS jamming and spoofing have already been reported. Cases of jamming are often not intentional and often have only very short-term and geographically limited impacts. However, there are also intentional cases of jamming and spoofing is intentional by default. Some cases of jamming/spoofing only concern the national sphere of a State and are not caused by other State actors. This is where remedies under national law may come into play. However, jamming and spoofing is also conducted by States or non-State actors attributable to them. This is where international law becomes relevant. In order to analyse the above-mentioned issues, the first part of the paper provides a brief overview on threats caused by GNSS jamming and spoofing. The second part addresses potential remedies under national law. The third part deals with remedies under international law, namely under the ITU legal framework, as well as under the UN Charter.
- Abstract document
- Manuscript document
IAC-20,E7,4,11,x56441.pdf (🔒 authorized access only).
To get the manuscript, please contact IAF Secretariat.