Integrated Safety Analysis: A Tool for the Safe Operations of Complex Adaptive Systems
- Paper number
IAC-19,D5,1,1,x54712
- Author
Dr. Ronald Freeman, United States, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
- Year
2019
- Abstract
Traditional hazard analysis techniques do not deliver adequate insight early in the design process, when most of the safety-related decisions are made. Furthermore, traditional techniques based on reliability theory resulted in the use of excessive design margin and redundancy as the "default" vehicle design choices. This equivocation of safety and reliability may have made sense for simpler launch vehicles of the past, but most modern space launch vehicle accidents have resulted from incorrect software specifications, component interaction accidents, and other design errors independent of the reliability of individual components. The successful Probabilistic Risk Assessment approach eliminated hazards and enabled high reliability in safe operations and overall mission outcome during the Apollo Program. Subsequently, “faster, better, cheaper” space program initiatives which focused on accelerating technological performance shifted from hazard analysis and prevention to risk management of optimal tradeoffs between safety and costs. From 1980 to 2015, 35% aerospace mishaps and accidents showed design errors type failures. Hardware failures have limited utility to the designer of modern complex systems. The concept of complexity signifies hidden interactions” functionally expressed in the system hardware not anticipated in the original design. A strong correlation exists between cost and schedule overruns and design complexity. These overruns affect safety by adding pressure to stay within budget and schedule.. This paper will explore current and future methods proposed to mitigate hazardous behaviors due to complexities of emergent component-component interactions that violate system safety goals. Addressing management issues of both hazards and design errors indicate an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed and used to develop a risk-informed safety cases (RISC) to ensure that significant gaps or faults leading to safety deficits are identified and corrected.
- Abstract document
- Manuscript document
IAC-19,D5,1,1,x54712.pdf (🔒 authorized access only).
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